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One of the key challenges that Ukraine is facing is the scale of its foreign debt (both public 
and private). As of 1st April it stood at US$ 126 billion, which is 109.8% of the country’s GDP. 
Approximately 45% of these financial obligations are short-term, meaning that they must be 
paid off within a year. Although the value of the debt has fallen by nearly US$ 10 billion since 
the end of 2014 (due to the private sector paying a part of the liabilities), the debt to GDP ratio 
has increased due to the recession and the depreciation of the hryvnia. The value of Ukraine’s 
foreign public debt is also on the rise (including state guarantees); since the beginning of 2015 
it has risen from US$ 37.6 billion to US$ 43.6 billion. Ukraine does not currently have the reso-
urces to pay off its debt. In this situation a debt restructuring is necessary and this is one of 
the top priorities for the Ukrainian government as well as for the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and its assistance programme. Without this it will be much more difficult for Ukraine to 
overcome the economic crisis. 
The Ukrainian government is currently negotiating with a group of private creditors (mainly 
American investment funds) which holds approximately 40% of the entire value of the bonds. 
A possible cancellation of part of the debt remains an essential element of the dispute. Kyiv is 
opting for this solution, whereas the private creditors are opposed to it – they agree only to 
relax the conditions of debt payment (reduced interest rates and an extension of the debt’s 
maturity) and a slight haircut. The negotiations began in April and gathered momentum in 
July. At present it is hard to predict the outcome. However, neither party wishes to see Ukraine 
defaulting, which leaves open the chance for an agreement to be reached. 
The debt that Ukraine owes to Russia will also be an important challenge for Ukraine since 
in this case chances of debt restructuring are slimmer. This applies above all to the payment 
of US$ 3 billion borrowed under Viktor Yanukovych’s presidency and which reaches maturi-
ty in December 2015. Russia is categorically refusing to discuss debt restructuring, let alone 
writing any of it off. Kyiv is currently focusing on the negotiations with the private creditors, 
hoping that success in these talks will strengthen its hand in its relations with Russia. 
Ukraine’s foreign debt 
In 2014 the value of Ukraine’s foreign debt 
decreased, however the debt to GDP ratio in-
creased. This was mainly due to a drop in the 
country’s GDP and the depreciation of the 
hryvnia. According to data from the National 
Bank of Ukraine (NBU), at the beginning of Janu-
ary 2015 gross foreign debt1 totalled US$ 126.3 
billion, against US$ 142 billion in 2014. Howev-
er, at the same time the gross foreign debt to 
1 It encompasses both the state’s foreign debt and the for-
eign debt of the private sector. 
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GDP ratio increased from 74.6% to 95.1%2. Even 
though the debt in total fell by over ten billion 
US dollars, due to a considerable decline in 
GDP the debt to GDP ratio is higher than it was 
in 2014. According to the NBU’s recent data, 
at the end of the first quarter of 2015 gross for-
eign debt in total fell to US$ 126 billion, which 
nevertheless represented 109.8% of the coun-
try’s GDP3. The IMF’s estimates indicate that the 
debt may reach 158% of GDP this year due to 
the expected decline in Ukraine’s GDP in 2015 
(see Chart 1). 
The nominal value of the foreign debt fell due 
to the reduction in private sector debt. Howev-
er, in 2014 state sector debt grew, above all due 
to the loans Ukraine had been granted under 
international assistance programmes, including 
those offered by the IMF, the EU, the Europe-
an Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD) or loans granted by particular countries 
such as the US, Japan and Canada. According to 
the IMF, in 2014 private sector debt decreased 
from US$ 110.4 billion to US$ 97.6 billion (from 
61.4% of GDP to 76.2% of GDP), whereas pub-
lic sector debt increased from US$ 30.2 bil-
lion to US$ 33.6 billion (from 16.8% to 26.2% 
of GDP)4. At the end of 2014 the value of pub-
lic debt and state guarantees in total stood at 
US$ 70.8 billion, which accounted for 72.7% of 
GDP (compared with 40.6% of GDP at the be-
2 The data obtained from the National Bank of Ukraine: 
Національний банк України, Платіжний баланс 
і зовнішній борг України 2014 рік, 2015.
3 The IMF’s statistics confirm this trend. According to 
them, the total value of the debt at the end of 2014 
dropped to US$ 131.1 billion from US$ 140.6 billion at 
the end of 2013. However, this increased the debt to GDP 
ratio from 78.3% to 102.4%. Quoted after: the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, Ukraine: Assessment of the Risks 
to the Fund and the Fund’s Liquidity Position, 2015.
4 International Monetary Fund, Ukraine: Assessment of 
the Risks to the Fund and the Fund’s Liquidity Position, 
2015. This trend is also confirmed by NBU statistics, ac-
cording to which the debt of the public sector grew in 
2014 from US$ 31.7 billion (22.3% GDP) to US$ 35.1 bil-
lion (27.7% of GDP), whereas the total debt of the bank-
ing sector and other industries as well as between com-
panies fell from US$ 110.4 billion (77.7% of GDP) to US$ 
91.2 billion (72.2% of GDP). However, in these statistics 
the banking sector and other sectors included state-
owned institutions. Quoted after: Національний банк 
України, Платіжний баланс і зовнішній борг України 
2014 рік, 2015. 
ginning of 2014)5. Foreign debt made up 55.6% 
of public debt and reached US$ 39.4 billion 
in total, including US$ 8 billion in state guaran-
tees6. The value of the Eurobonds and govern-
ment guarantees amounted to US$ 17.3 billion7. 
The remaining public debt comprised the gov-
ernment’s guarantees for loans and bonds is-
sued by state-owned companies, the debts in-
curred by the local authorities and the NBU’s 
liabilities to the IMF. The latest statistics from 
the Ministry of Finance of Ukraine which were 
published on 31st May 2015 reveal public debt at 
a level of US$ 33.9 billion and state guarantees 
amounting to US$ 9.7 billion (including nearly 
US$ 1 billion in state guarantees for loans grant-
ed by the Russian banks VTB, Gazprombank and 
Sberbank). In the structure of public debt the 
share of the financial obligations to international 
financial institutions (including the IMF, EIB and 
EBRD) was US$ 12.8 billion, bilateral debt was 
US$ 1.2 billion (including US$ 0.6 billion owed to 
Russia) and the value of issued bonds amounted 
to US$ 18.2 billion8 (see Table 1).
5 International Monetary Fund, Ukraine: Request for Ex-
tended Arrangement under the Extended Fund Facil-
ity and Cancellation of Stand-by Arrangement, p. 67, 
2015. The IMF’s statistics based on the data from the 
Ministry of Finance of Ukraine (MF). The statistics as of 
31st December 2014 point to US$ 69.8 billion, includ-
ing foreign debt and state guarantees standing at US$ 
38.81 billion. Quoted after: the Ministry of Finance of 
Ukraine, Статистичні матерали щодо державного та 
гарантованого державою борг України (станом на 
31.05.2015), http://www.minfin.gov.ua/control/uk/pub-
lish/archive/main?cat_id=34952 
6 International Monetary Fund, Ukraine: Request for Ex-
tended Arrangement under the Extended Fund Facility 
and Cancellation of Stand-by Arrangement, p. 67, 2015. 
The IMF’s statistics based on data from the Ministry of 
Finance of Ukraine. 
7 Ibid. 
8 The Ministry of Finance of Ukraine, Статистичні 
матерали щодо державного та гарантованого 
державою борг України (станом на 31.05.2015), 
http://www.minfin.gov.ua/control/uk/publish/archive/
main?cat_id=34952
Despite the value of Ukraine’s foreign debt 
decreasing in 2014, the debt to GDP ratio 
increased reaching 109.8% in May 2015.
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The high level of foreign debt and its structure 
poses one of the greatest threats to the sta-
bility of Ukraine’s economy and its chances of 
overcoming the crisis. On the one hand, there 
are high risks linked with Kyiv’s limited capaci-
ty to service the debt due to its high costs fol-
lowing the depreciation of the hryvnia, a fall in 
exports, and the low level of foreign-exchange 
reserves. As of 1st January 2015 the total value 
of short-term gross foreign liabilities (including 
the private and public sectors) amounted to 
US$ 55.1 billion9, whereas the total value of the 
foreign debt reached 184.4% of the value of ex-
ports. Foreign-exchange reserves were estimat-
ed at US$ 7.5 billion10 (due to foreign support, 
the foreign-exchange reserves reached the level 
of US$ 10.26 billion on 1st July 2015). 
Furthermore, Ukraine has very limited access 
to foreign financial markets and sources of fi-
nancing. It faces great difficulties in accessing 
foreign loans and they are very expensive. This 
is proven, among other factors, by the high val-
ue of credit default swaps (CDS) for Ukraine, 
an indicator which makes it possible to assess 
the current perception of the credit risk by fi-
nancial markets11. In the case of Ukraine the 
CDS is estimated at 19.2% (as of 13th April 2015) 
and comparable to the indicators for Venezuela 
and Argentina, whereas it is 1.2% for Poland, 
0.2% for Germany and 5.1% for Russia12. 
The restructuring of Ukraine’s debt 
– the priority in the reform programme 
The restructuring of Ukraine’s internal debt is 
one of the top priorities for the stabilisation 
of the economic and financial situation of 
the country both in the policy pursued by the 
Ukrainian government and in the policies of 
9 Національний банк України, Платіжний баланс 
і зовнішній борг України 2014 рік, p. 10, 2015.
10 Ibid. 
11 Credit default swaps (CDS) are derivatives which is an in-
surance against losses when a country is unable to pay off 
its debts due to default. CDS increase the costs of a loan.
12 Data quoted after: Deutsche Bank Research, Sovereign 
default probabilities online, accessed on 10.07.2015: 
https://www.dbresearch.com/servlet/reweb2.ReWEB?r-
wnode=DBR_INTERNET_EN-PROD$NAVIGATION&rwob-
j=CDS.calias&rwsite=DBR_INTERNET_EN-PROD
foreign assistance programmes, including the 
key programme of the IMF. The programme is 
set to relieve the burden of the economy and 
public finance which has been brought about 
by debt servicing, and to facilitate the use of 
funds to reconstruct foreign-exchange reserves 
and to implement economic reforms. The main 
objectives of the IMF programme, which is 
worth US$ 17.5 billion and will be implemented 
in 2015–201813, are the following: 1) to gener-
ate US$ 15.3 billion through debt restructur-
ing (although the IMF does not specify how 
the restructuring will be conducted and leaves 
it to be negotiated with Ukraine’s creditors); 
2) to reduce public debt to 71% of GDP by 2020; 
3) to keep the costs of debt servicing below 
10% of GDP a year on average from 2019–2025 
(not more than 12% of GDP in any one year)14. 
The IMF expects that these measures will ena-
ble Ukraine to return to the international finan-
cial markets in 2017, which will allow Ukraine 
to involve private capital in the economic re-
construction of the country and will enable it 
to gain access to funding from sources other 
than the IMF, other international financial in-
stitutions or countries. The IMF assumes that 
in 2017-2020 Ukraine will succeed in obtain-
ing approximately US$ 7 billion of capital from 
the private sector. The reduction of the debt is 
a significant element in the implementation 
of the programme of co-financing Ukraine. 
The programme is aimed at assuring that the 
country’s financial needs are met and it rep-
13 For more information on the programme see: Rafał 
Sadowski, Nowy program pomocy MFW dla Ukrainy, 
Analizy OSW, http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/
analizy/2015-02-12/nowy-program-pomocy-mfw-dla-
ukrainy
14 International Monetary Fund, Ukraine: Request for Ex-
tended Arrangement under the Extended Fund Facility 
and Cancellation of Stand-by Arrangement, 2015. 
The restructuring of internal debt is one 
of the top priorities for the stabilisation 
of the economic and financial situation 
in Ukraine.
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resents 38% of the value of aid programmes 
which the IMF estimates at US$ 40 billion 
(including financial assistance from the IMF 
and also other sources, see Table 2). 
At present Ukraine does not have the financial 
resources to pay off all of its foreign liabilities 
on time. The factors which have contributed to 
this are as follows: the economic crisis (including 
the dramatically low level of foreign-exchange 
reserves, the recession, a decline in exports, 
the depreciation of the national currency, the 
deficit in the current account balance, the lack 
of stability of the banking and financial systems)15, 
military operations in the east of the country 
and the conflict with Russia as well as instability 
within Ukrainian politics (including the lack of 
a stable political structure in parliament or in lo-
cal authorities, rivalry between political parties 
and the resistance of society and local oligarchic 
elites to the implementation of radical reforms). 
In this situation the restructuring of foreign debt 
is crucial. The Ukrainian government wishes to 
restructure bonds and the state-guaranteed 
bonds of state-run companies by reducing their 
value, extending their maturity and cutting the 
coupon. They are worth a total of at least US$ 
21.74 billion16, although their value should be 
15 For more information see: Tadeusz Iwański, A ship run 
aground. Deepening problems in the Ukrainian econ-
omy, OSW Commentaries, 16.06.2015, http://www.
osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2015-06-
16/a-ship-run-aground-deepening-problems-ukrainian-
economy
16 The total value of bonds is US$ 16.21 billion. Moreover, 
bonds issued by the city of Kyiv are worth US$ 0.55 bil-
lion, bonds issued by the following state-owned com-
panies: Fininpro (the state-owned infrastructure invest-
ment fund) – US$ 1.81 billion, Ukreximbank – US$ 1.48 
billion, Oschadbank – US$ 1.2 billion, Ukrzaliznytsia 
(the state-owned railway lines) – US$ 0.5 billion. After: 
MSN News, Ukraine-Crisis/Creditors, 20.05.2015, http://
www.msn.com/en-my/news/other/ukraine-crisis-credi-
tors-factbox/ar-BBjZJKY
estimated at US$ 23 billion17. In the first place 
this concerns the debt owed to a group of pri-
vate bondholders (investment funds, mainly 
American) and US$ 3 billion in the loan granted 
by Russia. At present the loans granted by inter-
national financial institutions and countries are 
not included in the negotiations (see Chart 2). 
The standout feature of Ukraine’s debt is its 
extraordinary concentration, i.e. a handful of 
creditors hold the bulk of it On the one hand, 
this state of affairs can be beneficial for Ukraine 
since reaching agreement with its key bond-
holders will allow it to restructure a large part 
of the debt. On the other hand, the key bond-
holders have a much stronger negotiating posi-
tion. All Ukraine’s foreign bonds are governed 
by British law18. This makes it impossible for 
Kyiv to use its domestic law in order to influ-
ence the management of the debt (e.g. to break 
the opposition of the bondholders)19.
The ‘Western front’ 
The Ukrainian government has started off ne-
gotiations on restructuring its debt with private 
Western creditors. These are Western invest-
ment funds, mainly American ones. Franklin 
Templeton is the largest holder of Ukrainian 
bonds, with an estimated value of US$ 6.5–7 
billion (depending on the source). In March 
2015 the fund launched an initiative to estab-
17 Loans granted to state-owned companies such as 
Ukravtodor, Yuzhnoye and Ukrmedpostach as well as 
bonds issued by Oschadbank in 2006 and 2013, whose 
value has not been made public, will also be subject 
to restructuring. MSN News, Ukraine-Crisis/Creditors, 
20.05.2015, http://www.msn.com/en-my/news/other/
ukraine-crisis-creditors-factbox/ar-BBjZJKY
Галина Калачова, Кредиторы отказываются 
списать часть долга Украины, Економічна правда, 
23.04.2015. http://www.epravda.com.ua/rus/publica-
tions/2015/04/23/539847/
18 Allen&Overy, How protective are Ukraine’s international 
bonds?, 27.01.2015. p. 2, http://www.allenovery.com/
publications/en-gb/Documents/GLIU_Ukraine_interna-
tional_bonds_Jan_2015.pdf
19 This move was used for example by Greece in 2012, see: 
Anna Gelpern, Ukraine’s Bond Restructuring: Surgery, 
Conspiracy, and Campaign, Credit Slips, 17.04.2015, 
ht tp: //www.credits l ips.org /credits l ips /2015/04 /
ukraines-bond-restructuring-constraints-and-delusions.
html
At present Ukraine does not have the fi-
nancial resources to pay off all of its for-
eign liabilities on time. Foreign public debt 
is estimated at US$ 23 billion.
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lish an ad hoc committee of holders of Ukraini-
an bonds20. It was composed of American funds 
TCW and T. Rowe Price and a Brazilian fund BTG 
Pactual Europe. The businesses grouped to-
gether in the ‘committee of creditors’ in total 
hold Ukrainian bonds worth approximately US$ 
8.9 billion21, which represents approximate-
ly 40% of the bonds issued. Furthermore, ac-
cording to the press, Ukrainian bonds are also 
held by American funds such as PIMCO (owned 
by Germany’s Allianz), Blackrock, Fidelity 
and Stone Harbor22 as well as Germany’s 
Deutsche Bank23.
Negotiations between the Ministry of Finance 
of Ukraine and the committee of bondholders 
– with the participation of IMF representatives 
– are of key importance for private creditors. 
As part of debt restructuring the Ukrainian 
government is pushing for the write off of 40% 
of the debt’s value, a ten-year extension of 
its maturity and a reduction in interest rates. 
The creditors are however opposed to debt re-
lief and this remains the major bone of conten-
tion. Nevertheless, they are rather favourable to 
an extension of its maturity and the cutting of 
the coupon. In the negotiation game currently 
underway, Ukraine is trying to exercise pressure 
by threatening to default on particular finan-
cial obligations to private creditors (this, how-
ever, does not automatically mean the entire 
country’s default). On 19th May 2015 the  Ver-
khovna Rada of Ukraine adopted a law which 
20 Natasha Doff et al., Ukraine Debt Negotiations 
a Step Closer as Templeton Forms Group, Bloomberg, 
1.04.2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/arti-
cles/2015-04-01/franklin-templeton-4-ukraine-credi-
tors-said-to-form-committee
21 Natasha Doff, Ukraine Shielded From Vultures by Tem-
pleton Has One Less Problem, Bloomberg, 23.04.2015, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-04-23/
ukraine-shielded-from-vultures-by-templeton-has-one-
less-problem
22 Sujata Rao et al., Franklin Templeton hires Blackstone 
to advise on Ukraine debt restructuring talks, Reuters, 
15.03.2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/15/
ukraine-crisis-bonds-idUSL6N0WH0XY20150315
23 Sujata Rao, Ukraine bondholders face haircuts and ex-
tensions, Reuters, 25.03.2015, http://www.reuters.com/
article/2015/03/25/ukraine-bonds-restructuring-idUSL-
6N0WP3I720150325
enables the government to withhold payments 
to holders of foreign bonds. The Ukrainian gov-
ernment has declared that it is prepared for 
a possible default on certain financial obliga-
tions and that this will not affect the banking 
system or the national currency24. The fact 
that the IMF announced in June 2015 that it 
would continue its assistance programme even 
if agreement with private bondholders is not 
reached is significantly helpful for Ukraine25. 
On 2nd July the IMF agreed to the payment of 
another tranche of the financial aid to Ukraine, 
worth US$ 1.7 billion. It will be transferred to 
Ukraine once the country meets the conditions 
of the current IMF programme.
Kyiv in negotiations with its Western creditors 
has justified its position saying that it does not 
have financial resources and does not want to 
use its foreign-exchange reserves in order to 
pay off its debt. The Ukrainian government has 
also emphasised that the creditors lent to the 
former president, Yanukovych, who was oust-
ed in February 2014, and this helped his regime 
function. In June 2015 finance minister Natalie 
Jaresko presented a new proposal which make 
it possible for part of the costs incurred by the 
creditors to be compensated to those who 
agreed to write off Ukraine’s debt, but only if 
the country’s economic recovery is more rapid 
than projected. 
24 One of the latest statements regarding this issue: 
Ukrinform, Яресько знову не виключила можливість 
технічного дефолту, 16.07.2015, http://www.ukrin-
form.ua/ukr/news/yaresko_znovu_ne_lyuchila_mogliv-
ist_tehnichnogo_defoltu_2075154 
25 International Monetary Fund, IMF Managing Director 
Issues Statement on Ukraine, press release no. 15/272, 
12.06.2015, http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2015/ 
pr15272.htm
In the first place, the Ukrainian govern-
ment wants to restructure its debt with pri-
vate Western creditors – mainly American 
investment funds.
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The private creditors have replied that de-
faulting on the debt will prevent Ukraine from 
having access to the international financial 
markets. This will also infringe one of the con-
ditions of the IMF programme which assumes 
that Ukraine will return to the international fi-
nancial markets in 2017. Furthermore, it will tar-
nish the country’s reputation in the eyes of pro-
spective investors. In consequence, Ukraine will 
find it very difficult to apply for external fund-
ing. Foreign private creditors do not want to 
be the only ones to bear the costs of Ukraine’s 
debt restructuring since debt relief is supposed 
to be limited to private bondholders, and not 
to extend to all creditors (it will not extend to 
countries or internal creditors). Private creditors 
claim that Ukraine’s problem is solvency, not 
the volume of its debt26. The proposal they have 
put forward allows for the debt to be substi-
tuted by securities which will be repaid should 
Ukraine’s GDP increase to a specified level27. 
This, in fact, makes it possible to extend the 
debt’s maturity and cut the coupon. According 
to the private creditors this will bring approxi-
mately US$ 16 billion to Ukraine in savings and 
will allow the country to meet the IMF pro-
gramme’s terms and conditions without debt 
cancellation28. So far the ongoing negotiations 
have not led to a definite agreement. In April 
2015 it was possible to delay the payment of 
US$ 750 to Ukreximbank, and in August there 
was a delay in the purchase of bonds worth US$ 
1.3 billion issued by the state-run Oschadbank. 
The negotiations gathered speed in July when 
during talks with the participation of IMF rep-
resentatives both parties made certain tactical 
concessions. These included creditors allowing 
26 The letter of representatives of the bondholder com-
mittee, Haircut on bonds is wrong path for Ukraine, 
Financial Times, 17.06.2015, http://www.ft.com/intl/
cms/s/0/6af24a6a-1123-11e5-9bf8-00144feabdc0.htm-
l?siteedition=intl#ixzz3dJYDuDrm
27 Ibid.
28 Elena Popina, Natasha Doff, Goldman Sees Ukraine 
Default in July as Debt Standoff Holds, Bloomberg, 
25.06.2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/ 
2015-06-22/ukraine-creditors-request-latest-imf-esti-
mate-to-assess-proposal
the possibility of up to 5% of the debt being 
written off29, and the Ukrainian government 
presented a new proposal. It did not, though, 
make its details public30.
The ‘Eastern front’ 
For Ukraine the debt it owes to Russia is equal-
ly important to its debt to private bondhold-
ers. This applies above all to a loan of US$ 
3 billion which reaches maturity on 24th De-
cember 2015. From Russia’s point of view this 
loan granted in December 2013 was a political 
instrument intended to provide support for Vik-
tor Yanukovych after he rejected the EU associ-
ation agreement. The terms and conditions of 
the loan seemed to be quite advantageous for 
Ukraine – a large sum, rapidly transferred, with 
a 5% interest rate, which was half the rate of-
fered on the financial markets at that time. 
However, the loan has proven to be an effec-
tive tool which has given Russia considerable 
leverage in Ukraine. Despite the fact that it is 
an official, government-to-government loan and 
both parties – the creditor and the debtor – are 
state institutions, it is formally a private loan31. 
29 Sujata Rao, Ukraine sees end of next week as “absolute” 
deadline for debt deal – source, Reuters, 31.07.2015, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/31/ukraine-cri-
sis-debt-negotiation-idUSL5N10B4HL20150731. 
This information has not been officially confirmed. 
According to one of the sources, these are two five per-
centage point cancellations. 
30 Економічна правда, Мінфін направив кредиторам 
нову пропозицію щодо реструктуризації боргу, 
Економічна правда, 4.08.2015, http://www.epravda.
com.ua/news/2015/08/4/553763/
31 Josh Cohen, Russia Has Ukraine’s Economy in a Choke 
Hold, Moscow Times, 31.03.2015, http://www.themos-
cowtimes.com/opinion/article/russia-has-ukraines-
economy-in-a-choke-hold/518324.html
Unlike Western creditors, who are mo-
tivated solely by business interests and 
possible profits, Russia sees financial in-
struments above all as a tool to achieve its 
political goals.
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Russians have deliberately designed it in this 
manner in order to be able to treat it as they see 
fit – either as official or a private loan – and to 
reap the benefits resulting from both forms32. 
This means that if Ukraine fails to repay this 
debt, the implications may be the following: 
- if the loan is treated as official debt – the IMF 
aid programme will be halted33;
- if it is regarded as private debt – the possibility 
to take out loans on the private financial mar-
kets will be blocked. 
Although the statements which representatives 
of Moscow have made thus far treat this loan 
as bilateral debt, Russia has not reported it to 
the Paris Club (an informal group of national 
creditors which deals with states’ debts). For-
mally, in the transaction the Russian National 
Wealth Fund bought Ukrainian bonds which are 
governed by British law and listed on the Irish 
stock exchange34. This limits Ukraine’s possibil-
ities to use its domestic law in order to defend 
its interests. Another provision which gives 
Russia considerable leverage is the possibility 
to call in the loan if Ukraine’s public debt ex-
ceeds 60% of GDP. This occurred in spring 2015. 
So far, though, Moscow has not used this option. 
The manner in which the loan agreement was 
designed substantially limits Ukraine’s possi-
bility to restructure it and is very beneficial to 
Russia. The government in Kyiv officially treats 
this loan as private debt and thus subject to re-
structuring. However, this is being controversial 
from a legal point of view35. This is important 
since according to IMF rules it is impossible to 
32 Anna Gelpern, Russia’s Bond: It’s Official! (... and 
Private ... and Anything Else It Wants to Be ...), 
Credit Slips, 17.04.2015, http://www.creditslips.org/
creditslips/2015/04/russias-ukraine-bond-its-official-
and-private-and-anything-else-it-wants-to-be-.html
33 The IMF, bound by its regulations, cannot assist states 
which have defaulted on their financial obligations to 
other states. 
34 This means that all disputes will be tried in British courts. 
35 Anna Gelpern, Debt Sanctions Can Help Ukraine and Fill 
a Gap in the International System, Policy brief, Peterson 
Institute for International Economics, August 2014.
Sujata Rao, Chris Spink, London or Paris: which is the 
club for Russia’s Ukraine debt?, Reuters, 26.03.2015, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/27/ukraine-rus-
sia-bonds-idUSL6N0WR4J620150327
grant financial aid to countries which have de-
faulted on financial obligations to other coun-
tries. The IMF has not yet taken a clear stance on 
this issue. However, when complicated Ukrain-
ian-Russian relations are taken into account, 
with the conflict occurring on many different 
levels (political, military, economic, energy), the 
Ukrainian government are focusing above all 
on peace talks (the Minsk and Normandy for-
mats) and gas negotiations. It has not yet taken 
any steps in order to deal with its debt apart 
from calling for talks about it. Russia, however, 
has rejected this proposal. Up to now Kyiv has 
been fulfilling the commitments of the agree-
ment with Russia. On 20th June Ukraine paid 
US$ 75 million in interest rates on time.
Unlike Western creditors, who are motivated 
solely by business interests and possible prof-
its, Russia sees financial instruments above all 
as a tool to achieve its political goals. In the 
conflict with Ukraine the Kremlin has not yet 
decided to use the financial instrument and 
completely destabilise the Ukrainian financial 
system, for example by demanding that the 
loan be repaid. The reason for this is that the 
Kremlin is interested in avoiding Ukraine’s total 
economic collapse since this would have grave 
economic implications for Russia due economic 
ties that bind the two countries and the inter-
ests of Russian businesses (for example, Rus-
sia is the fifth largest investor in Ukraine)36. 
36 The officially reported investments of Cyprus (28.5% 
of all foreign investments in Ukraine) are in fact partly 
Russian investments. Between 31st December 2013 and 
1st April 2015 the value of Russian investments in Ukraine 
fell nearly twofold from US$ 4.3 billion (a 7.4% of share 
in all investments) to US$ 2.2 billion (a 5.4% share). 
Quoted after: the State Statistics Service of Ukraine (Ukr-
stat), Прямі іноземні інвестиції (акціонерний капітал) 
з країн світу в економіці України, http://www.ukrstat.
gov.ua/
A loan of US$ 3 billion granted by Russia 
could become a tool which gives it consid-
erable leverage in Ukraine.
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Despite this Ukrainian debt remains an effec-
tive tool which can be employed at any time in 
order to apply pressure on Kyiv. One of the op-
tions which would allow Kyiv to neutralise this 
instrument of coercion would be to pay off the 
debt on time. Ukraine, however, does not have 
the financial resources to repay it (the debt ac-
counts for 30% of its foreign-exchange reserves 
which are far below the safe level anyway). 
Another problem is that this move would de-
prive Ukraine of arguments in its negotiations 
with private bondholders, in which it is de-
manding the cancellation of 40% of the debt.
The spectre of a Ukrainian default? 
In a situation in which Ukraine does not have the 
financial resources to pay off the entirety of its 
of debt, the game is focused on who will bear 
the costs of helping Ukraine out of its financial 
crisis and to what extent: Kyiv or the countries 
and international institutions which provide aid 
to Ukraine or private and state creditors, in-
cluding Russia. It seems nobody wants to see 
Ukraine default – not the creditors since they 
would lose any chance of getting their money 
back, not Ukraine because this would prevent 
it from having access to international financial 
markets, not the Western countries (mainly 
Germany) and the IMF because this would lead 
to increased economic assistance provided to 
Ukraine (the IMF wants Ukraine to seek funding 
on private capital markets, not to borrow from 
the IMF). As for Russia, on the one hand it is in-
terested in further weakening Ukraine. On the 
other hand, were Ukraine to default, the finan-
cial collapse would affect the business interests 
of Russian companies. 
At present the course and results of the nego-
tiations with private creditors will be of crucial 
importance. On 24th July Ukraine paid US$ 120 
million in coupon on time37. On 23rd Septem-
ber sovereign bonds worth US$ 500 million will 
reach maturity. Should no agreement be found 
with private creditors, Ukraine has declared it is 
ready to default on these obligations.
37 Elaine Moore and Joel Lewin, Ukraine avoids default with 
$120m interest payment, Financial Times, 24.07.2015, 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d98550fc-31f9-11e5-91ac-
a5e17d9b4cff.html#ixzz3hl2hUnZS
This paper was completed on 4th August 2015. 
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APPENDIX
Table 1. The structure of Ukraine’s public debt as of 31st May 2015 in US$ thousand
Category US$ thousand
Total public debt 
and state guarantees 
67,660,179
Total public debt 56,735,956
Internal debt 22,868,079
Foreign debt 33,867,877
1. Debt owed to international financial 
institutions:
12,781,551
EU 1,754,255
European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development
540,156
European Investment Bank 431,094
World Bank 4,236,499
International Monetary Funds 5,819,095
Clean Technology Fund 450
2. Debt to other countries 1,174,974
Canada 320,612
Germany 7,627
Russia 605,856
US 10,447
Japan 230,432
3. Debt owed to commercial banks Chase Manhattan Bank Luxembourg 
S.A.
56
Chart 1. Ukraine’s gross foreign debt in 2011-2015, the value in US$ billion and the percentage 
of GDP at the end of the period
Source: the National Bank of Ukraine
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Category US$ thousand
4. Issuance of securities on foreign 
markets (Eurobonds) 
18,203,760
5. Other categories of debt International Monetary Fund 1,707,536
Total state guarantees 10,924,223
State guarantees for internal debt 1,273,498
State guarantees for foreign debt 9,650,724
1. Debt to international 
financial institutions 
4,460,430
European Atomic Energy Community 23,571
European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development 
84,821
World Bank 368,208
International Monetary Fund 3,983,828
2. Debts owed to other countries Canada 219,325
3. Debts owed to commercial banks 3,049,723
Citibank, N.A. London 60,993
Credit Suisse International 126,000
Deutsche Bank AG London 7,143
UniCredit Bank Austria AG 50,911
VTB Capital PLC 73,467
Gazprombank 500,000
China Development Bank 78,540
Export-Import Bank of China 1,552,124
Eksportowo-Importowy Bank Korei 179,403
Export-Import Bank of Korea 179,403
Sberbank 421,143
4. State guarantees for securities 
issued by:
Fininpro (state-run infrastructure 
investment agency) 
1,808,000
5. Other categories of debts International Monetary Fund 113,247
Source: Ministry of Finance of Ukraine
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Table 2. The debt restructuring under the IMF programme for Ukraine, in US$ billion
2015 2016 2017 2018 In total 
Ukraine’s financial needs 21.4 6.8 6.9 4.8 40.0
Increase in currency reserves 10.8 3.9 6.3 6.7 27.7
Deficit in current account 
balance 10.6 2.9 0.7 -1.9 12.3
Financing  21.4 6.8 6.9 4.8 40.0
Total financial support 16.3 3.5 2.5 25 24.7
Debt restructuring 5.2 3.4 4.4 2.3 15.3
The share of the debt restruc-
turing in financing Ukraine’s 
needs, in percentage
24% 50% 64% 48% 38%
Source: International Monetary Fund, Ukraine: Request for Extended Arrangement under the Exten-
ded Fund Facility and Cancellation of Stand-by Arrangement, 2015
Chart 2. The value and maturity of bonds and state-guaranteed bonds, in US$ million
Source: MSN News, Ukraine-Crisis/Creditors, 20.05.2015, http://www.msn.com/en-my/news/other/
ukraine-crisis-creditors-factbox/ar-BBjZJKY
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